The Core

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Notes for CS 8803 - Game Theory and Computer Science. Spring 2008


Scribe: Liam Mac Dermed

Lecturer: Yair Tauman

The Core of V: (Shapley and Gillies 1953)

A set of payoff vectors (x1,...,xn) s.t. x_i\geq V(i)
and \sum_{i\in S} x_i \geq V(S) \ \ \ \forall \ S\subseteq N
and \sum_{i\in S} x_i = V(N)

if \sum x_i < V(S) for some S then S can object since S can do better by itself.

Note: The core is convex, since it is the solution of a set of linear constraints. For the same reason, it can contain zero, exactly one, or infinite vectors.


Example 1

A simple majority game with N = {1,2,3}

I.E. V(S) =

1 if |S| \geq 2
0 otherwise


suppose that x \in C(V) then from our definition of the core:

x_1 + x_2 \geq V(1,2) = 1
x_1 + x_3 \geq V(1,3) = 1
x_2 + x_3 \geq V(2,3) = 1

thus 2x_1 + 2x_2 + 2x_3 \geq 3 so x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \geq 1.5 but we know that V(1,2,3) = 1 so C(V) = \emptyset.


Example 2

N = {1,2,3} where players 1 and 2 have a left glove while player 2 has a right glove.

V(S) =

1 if S = {1,3} or {2,3} or {1,2,3}
0 otherwise


Suppose (x_1, x_2, x_3) \in C(V)

x_1 + x_2 \geq V(1,2) = 1
x_1 \geq 0
x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \geq V(1,2,3) = 1

therefore x2 = 0.

The same logic can be applied to show x1 = 0 so x3 = 1.

Both left gloves (player 1 and 2) are in competition with each other and for any positive allocation to the other player can offer player 3 a bigger piece of the pie. Thus player 3 will get everything. C(V) = (0,0,1).

Example 3

N = {1,2,3,4,5} where now players 1 and 2 have left gloves and players 3,4 and 5 have right gloves.

L = {1,2}

R = {3,4,5}

V(S) = \min( |S\cap L|, |S\cap R| )


like above: C(V) = (1,1,0,0,0).

if |L| = |R| then they will all get 1/2.


The production of this material was supported in part by NSF award SES-0734780.

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