Market Equilibrium
From Theory
Consider a game with following characteristics:
- N players
- m divisible goods
-
endowment of each player, i.e. how much the player has of each good
-
, ui strictly increasing and concave, the utility function of player i
- prices
, i.e. p is the price vector for the m goods. Assume that
- wealth
of each player
- demand for i (given prices p and wealth w)
, i.e. demand is a function
Define the aggregate excess demand as
,
.
We say the market clears if Z(p) = 0. In this case, the aggregate demand for each of the m goods equals the aggregate supply for the good.
Theorem:
Given any market, there exist prices
such that the market clears.
Proof:
We use Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem:
Given a continuous function
over a convex compact set
, then
.
In our case, let
.
with | ∑ | fi(p) = 1 |
| i |
Then according to the Fixed Point Theorem
, i.e. fi(p * ) = p * for all i.
We further assume
for all i.
where | C = 1 + | ∑ | max(0,zj(p * )) |
| j |
Consider two cases:
Case 1: C=1
In this case we have
for i=1,...,m.
| z(p * )p * = | ∑ | (xi(p * ,p * ei)p * − eip * ) = 0 |
| i |
Case 2: C>1
, which yields zi(p * ) > 0 for all i (due to the assumption
). This, however, is a contradiction to | z(p * )p * = | ∑ | (xi(p * ,p * ei)p * − eip * ) = 0 |
| i |
Thus, we must be in case 1. Since zi(p * ) = 0 for all i, the market clears at price p * .
